








The “principle of double effect” is a vital tool for moral decision making and is applicable to all areas of medical practice, including (for example) end-of-life care, transplant medicine, and cases of conscientious objection. Both our ultimate and our more immediate intentions are relevant in making and evaluating choices—though side effects must be kept proportionate and can be morally conclusive when linked with some intentions. Intentions help to form the character of doctors, and of human beings generally. While hypocrisy is certainly possible in regard to this form (and other forms) of moral reasoning, double effect reasoning, sincerely practised, remains indispensable in identifying moral problems and solutions.
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Introduction 
The “principle of double effect” or “double effect reasoning” can sound rather technical, and many associate it only with life and death dilemmas, in medicine or elsewhere. The terms may sound forbidding, but double effect reasoning is in fact a very common way of approaching human actions, involving as it does a different assessment of those effects of an action we intend and those we merely foresee. 

The central idea is that while foreseen side effects must still be considered and balanced against good intended effects, especially good effects for the same person, it can be important whether a bad effect (we might think of harm to patients in a clinical trial) is “merely” foreseen, or whether it is also intended as an end or as a means. While the “steps” or conditions in this kind of reasoning come in different versions, the following list is fairly representative: for our action to be justified, (1) our immediate act, informed by our immediate intention, must be good, (2) our further intention must be good, (3) the bad effect must not be the means to the good effect, and (4) there must be a proportionate reason to tolerate the bad effect in view of the good we are intending. 

The distinction between intention and foresight made in double effect reasoning is familiar to all of us. We learn as children to defend ourselves from criticism by saying, “I didn’t mean to—it was an accident.” Then we learn to defend ourselves—and accuse others—by referring to what was or was not intended among clearly foreseen events. While saying that someone is or is not “doing it deliberately” is morally only the beginning of the story, if harm is deliberate, this can at least aggravate any wrongdoing there may be. 

There is a difference between what we intend and what we foresee, and this difference is important. Morality is very much about (though not only about) our “intentions:” short- or long-term purposes or aims. That doesn’t just apply to moral absolutes, for those of us who believe in moral absolutes, but to things which morally could be intended in some situations, but should not normally be intended. For example, we may foresee that criticizing someone will undermine their confidence and cause them pain: to intend this, as opposed to foreseeing it, is normally wrong, though perhaps not in every situation. 
 
Ultimate Intentions
Many critics of double effect reasoning are happy to accept that there is a difference between doing something with an ultimate intention or motive that is good and one that is bad. However, while it is true that ultimate intentions count, so do more immediate intentions: many deeply immoral activities can be motivated by genuine concern for the good of science, the good of the country, the human race, the planet, and so on. There is no reason to think that intentions matter only higher up the chain of intentions while those lower down do not. To take it upon ourselves to kill an innocent person to benefit humanity would still be murder. Put simply, “the end doesn’t justify the means,” at least where the means are immoral in themselves.

Multiple Intentions
It should be stressed here that a person is often intending several things in a given situation. Take the case of a doctor who gives a patient a lethal injection (in a country which allows this). The doctor may be intending to move her fingers, to empty the contents of the needle into the patient, to kill the patient, to end the patient’s pain, and to satisfy the patient’s request. It will not be honest for the doctor to say afterwards, “I was only intending to move my fingers,” or “I was only intending to end pain.” The doctor was certainly intending both these things, but she was also intending, in our imagined case, to end the patient’s life. Whatever we think of the morality of euthanasia, if we believe that there are any moral absolutes, then it seems that some intentions cannot be justified by good intentions elsewhere in the “chain.” Whether alone or in conjunction with some merely foreseen fact—such as the known innocence of the victim—with regard to some intentions, the rule is, as we might say, “one strike, and you’re out.” 

For those readers who may still be skeptical, some examples from the area of war may perhaps be persuasive. If carpet bombing or use of nuclear weapons is rightly condemned as a war crime, is this not because innocents, or human beings indiscriminately, are being targeted intentionally? Is there not a special wrong in presuming to target innocent people, however good our further intentions? Even if going to war itself could be justified in principle, the murder of innocents or similar crimes, such as rape used as a weapon of war, can very quickly turn a “just” war into an unjust one, for some at least of those involved.

Confusing Issues
It is, however, important to remember that intentions, while they can certainly be morally conclusive, are only one item in a moral checklist of concerns. “Mere” side effects can still be out of all proportion to any good, or realistic good, at which we may be aiming. If, in targeting an enemy soldier, we use a bomb big enough to flatten a village, our act is grossly disproportionate even if we are aiming at the soldier alone. Or if, in treating a patient, we use a much more dangerous or unpleasant drug than we need to, we cannot obviously defend ourselves by saying that side effects are none of our concern. 
	
To ignore the need to keep side effects proportionate is a mistake often made in considering double effect reasoning. Another mistake is to confuse intentions with feelings: there is a difference between what we intend and what we welcome or regret. To welcome the side effect of freeing a hospital bed when a patient’s life support is discontinued is very different from intending the patient’s death and liberated bed. However glad we may be that a bed will be available for someone else who needs one, a patient’s death should not be deliberately sought in order to achieve this. The reverse is true, in that regretting some outcome does not mean we don’t intend it. Someone can kill a person with extreme reluctance, but no less deliberately for that. Many murderers act with reluctance, even if psychopaths do not. 

Another mistake is to confuse the intention/foresight distinction with the act/omission distinction or the causing/allowing distinction, whereas these are separate issues to consider when evaluating options. Causation has its own moral significance, but should not be confused with intention. Deaths can be brought about deliberately by omission as well as by an act: if freeing beds by arranging patient deaths is among our intentions in withholding treatment, this significantly changes what we do. Conversely, a patient may die as a genuine side effect of either an omission (for example, the choice to treat another patient) or an action such as giving the patient a risky dose of some potentially useful drug. To cause an effect by a bodily intervention does not always mean to intend it.

Hypocrisy
Double effect reasoning is sometimes dismissed as a hypocritical maneuver on the part of those who want to hide, rather than reveal, their true intentions.1 And certainly double effect can be deceitfully appealed to—but then, so can other forms of moral reasoning. Whatever our true rationale for acting, we can always pretend that we are doing something different. We may get away with our deceit, or we may not: juries are asked every day to decide as best they can what the accused was intending. However, the most important thing is, of course, whether we are morally justified in what we do, not whether we will get away with it. Law and punishment are one thing; ethics is another, and a doctor should, one would hope, be concerned with ethics first and foremost. 

Critics of double effect reasoning will sometimes deny that a bad effect is truly unintended if it is foreseen. “You knew it would happen,” the accusation runs, “so you must have intended it.” It is interesting that this is more often said when there is something morally questionable in the choice at issue. After all, we do not normally claim that a doctor who foresees that chemotherapy will make a patient’s hair fall out “must” intend to make the patient bald. Hair loss as such will do nothing for cancer, and the doctor is unlikely to think it will.

In contrast, where there is some more questionable choice, perhaps involving a bodily intervention of a very harmful kind, people are more likely to claim that the bad effect “must” have been intended. There is, however, no need to assume this in order to criticize the action, if criticism is due. To say that intentions are morally relevant—indeed, sometimes morally conclusive—is not to say that they are the only morally relevant or even morally conclusive consideration.

Morally Conclusive Side Effects
An example to illustrate the last point would be a case where vital organs were harvested from someone known to be alive. It may well be psychologically possible for some particular surgeon to harvest the organs without intending death; after all, the donor’s death will not in any way promote the goal of using the organs. There is, however, an intention clearly present which seems jointly conclusive morally with what is foreseen: the intention to invade the donor’s body, in a way foreseen to do that person only serious permanent harm. It is not the intention alone but its combination with a very serious foreseen harm which is morally conclusive here. And due to this special combination, it is not just a matter of weighing the intended good effects against the unintended bad effects, as we might do in a case of live organ donation where the donor would recover. Whatever the good to be obtained for others, no amount of good can justify the intention to invade the body of an innocent person while foreseeing no health good, but only lethal harm, for that person. If someone is intending as much as that, and knows about the harm, then this is quite bad enough: we need not pretend that death itself is intended in order to condemn this kind of action. People have, in other words, special rights when it comes to deliberate invasions of their bodies of a kind that do them only serious harm.2

Character of Doctors
Unjustified intentions of this kind harm the perpetrator no less than the victim; in particular, they damage the agent’s relationship with the victim and make the agent more likely to behave in similar ways in the future. The homicidal organ harvester and his or her collaborators are more likely to see future patients as mere collections of bodily material for the possible use of others. If it is true that medicine is centrally focused on serving life and health, then there is something peculiarly destructive to a doctor’s character in choosing to use a patient to such lethal effect. 

Of course, there is also something peculiarly destructive in aiming at a patient’s death or permanent injury, as we see in the case of lethal human experimentation, or indeed euthanasia. It is one thing to intend that (say) a terminal patient spend his remaining time in greater comfort and something quite different to intend that the patient stop spending time on this earth. As hospice workers so often emphasize, palliative care is not about dying, but about living till you die. It is not for doctors to destroy purposely, in the words of JLA Garcia, a patient’s last remnants of health.3

Conscientious Objection
A less familiar, but important, use of double effect reasoning relates to conscientious objection. If a stance of conscientious objection is well-grounded—which will at least sometimes be the case—it would seem that what is wrong for the objector to do will also be wrong for others, whether or not they know that. For example, if deliberate killing of patients really does go against the central ethos of medicine, it will go against this whatever the sincerity of those prepared to get involved. And if I believe sincerely that some practice is unethical and harmful to my patient, I should not be trying to get someone else to do precisely what I think is wrong. If I disagree with assisted suicide, for example, I should not deliberately help my patient find another doctor who will do or arrange this. Certainly, I may well foresee that my patient will in practice find a more compliant doctor—for example, that when I go off duty, the very next doctor will comply. Or my patient may herself go elsewhere immediately when I tell her, as I offer her the care I think she needs, that she is of course free to seek a second opinion from whomever she chooses—though as her doctor I hope she will understand that I cannot in good conscience help her get something I honestly believe will do her harm.4 Here as elsewhere, foreseeing a bad effect (another doctor’s wrongdoing) is morally different from intending it: I am much more responsible for what I choose myself than for other people’s choices I foresee.

A complication in the case of suicide is that it can be committed by omission as well as by an act; it can even be arranged in advance by a patient who refuses treatment with the precise aim that she die. Failure to override a clearly suicidally motivated refusal of treatment does not necessarily mean that the doctor also must be intending death.5 However, the doctor may wish to avoid the appearance of collusion, especially if he or she is expected to remove a feeding tube or give sedation to prevent the (previously) suicidal patient feeling thirst. Such a doctor may feel a need to withdraw from the patient’s care if the advance refusal cannot be challenged (for example, on the grounds that the patient may have been depressed or unaware of all the implications). In informing, for example, the Medical Director of my hospital that I am unable to go on being responsible for a patient, I may well foresee that the Medical Director will immediately find a doctor with fewer qualms. To report my inability need not, however, be intended as a way of passing over to a less squeamish colleague: I should do nothing with the aim of getting someone to “do my dirty work for me” (to use a crude but apt phrase). 

Burden on Doctors
For those readers who may now be wondering if this kind of reasoning is not an undue burden on doctors, there are two points to bear in mind. One is that it is very much in the doctor’s interest to retain his or her moral integrity: if these moral distinctions are real and not imaginary, then respecting them is good for doctors too. Few of us believe literally that the end justifies the means; hence our horror at the idea of human rights abuses in a medical environment. Carrying out lethal experiments on human beings might well have good results for future patients; however, results are not the sole criterion for determining how we should behave. Morality is, above all, about our choices—not just our ends but the means we employ—and the impact of our choices on our character. By choosing in a certain way, we make ourselves, for good or bad, people of one kind rather than another. Some choices help to make us good human beings; other choices have the reverse effect on the kind of people we become. We should take this kind of thing seriously if we want our lives to be successful in the deepest way they can be.

Lifting Burdens
However, it is also worth remembering that moral distinctions, including those involved in double effect reasoning, can often lift a burden and show that we should be feeling not more guilty, but less so. One example would be the allocation of resources, very much including the doctor’s time. Apart from the needs of other patients, doctors themselves need time for relaxation; in any event, there is no duty for doctors to spend all their waking hours doing medicine. Doctors are not murderers if they stop saving lives occasionally and spend time with their family and friends: it is enough if they do what they reasonably can to promote life and health while avoiding any choices which are morally precluded. In an understaffed hospital especially, patients may die because off-duty doctors are home with their families, but such foreseen deaths are not intended but merely accepted as an outcome of doctors doing other good—and indeed necessary—things besides their work. Double effect reasoning, together with a sensible grasp of our own various roles and vocations, can protect us against an impossible situation where we feel responsible for everything all the time. 

Double effect reasoning can also let patients and relatives “off the hook” in a way that owes nothing to hypocrisy and everything to sane and balanced thinking. As a medical ethicist, I sometimes find myself reassuring anxious relatives that withdrawing a health care procedure from a dying person can be legitimate, providing its burdens are truly disproportionate (or at least optional) and providing no one aims at hastening death. For relatives to see themselves as justified in accepting death, as opposed to intending it, can be helpful to them and indeed to the patient, who may otherwise feel pressured to accept over-burdensome procedures where the benefit is now very slight. 

Conclusion
To conclude: double effect reasoning is not, as I have tried to show, an arcane or “niche” way of thinking but is rather a widely used and indispensable tool for moral action. It needs to be correctly placed in a wider context and supplemented with concrete moral norms, but distinguishing side effects from intended effects is crucial not just for doctors but for human beings generally. 
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